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Abstract. A common assumption in the research community working on location privacy in location-
based services (LBS) is that the location sources are trusted. In this paper we present a different
perspective. We argue that, because of the deployment of wifi-based/hybrid positioning techniques
and web-based LBSs, the user’s location is increasingly computed by third-party location providers
which may be not fully trusted. This change of perspective challenges the effectiveness of current
location privacy-preserving techniques. To support this thesis we present an empirical investigation
of the privacy issues raised by web-based LBSs. Moreover, following a holistic approach, we present
the problem from three different and complementary angles, i.e., technical, user-based, and legal.
The overall picture suggests a novel direction of research.
Keywords. Location-based services, location privacy, privacy standards
1 Introduction
Research on location privacy in LBS is strongly influenced by the evolution of the posi-
tioning technologies. For example, the assumption that has driven the research in this
area over the last decade, since the seminal work of Gruteser et al. [9], is that the location
source (location provider, hereinafter) is trusted. Typically, the position is acquired by a GPS-
equipped client. Gruteser el at. [9] formulate the research problem in these terms: how to
prevent the accumulation of identifiable location information in the systems of untrusted
LBS providers.
Since this very first approach, research on location privacy has been developing along
various directions [5]. Different taxonomies have been proposed to classify privacy pro-
tection techniques in LBS, ranging from fine-grained classifications focused on narrow do-
mains such as [13, 1, 2], to coarse-grained classifications embracing a large spectrum of
approaches such as [7, 14]. For example, Jensen et al. [13] present a detailed classification
of solutions in client-server architectures, focusing on the techniques which target location
privacy as opposed to identity privacy, and which apply to snapshot queries based on the
users location. Krumm et al. [14] survey privacy threats which reconstruct user’s identities
and additional personal information from the traces of pseudo-anonymized individuals.
Moreover, over the last years, LBSs have evolved from simple search-based services, e.g,.
where is the closest restaurant, to location sharing applications, e.g., where are my friends. Lo-
cation sharing applications introduce additional privacy requirements, for example, how
to degrade the quality of the position information so as to prevent the localization of users
1
2in sensitive places, e.g., hospitals [3, 5]. Yet, in spite of the diversity of privacy-preserving
methods, all of these techniques share the initial assumption, i.e., that the location provider
is trusted.
In this paper we present a different perspective. We argue that in the general case the loca-
tion providers, which are obviously aware of the user’s position, are not fully-trusted and
thus can disclose position data without the explicit user’s consent. Moreover, the existing
privacy-preserving techniques provide little support against this kind of privacy leak. We
bring two arguments to support this thesis. Both of them are grounded on the on-going
technological trend:
• Positioning technologies other than GPS are becoming increasingly popular, in partic-
ular public wifi-based positioning systems (WPS). WPS offers exciting opportunities
because the position can be determined both indoor and outdoor, at an accuracy that
is sufficient in most applications. Since people spend most of their time indoor, it
is evident the advantage of using this technology that does not require a dedicated
infrastructure, is cheap, and is commonly available on a variety of devices. The idea
behind this technique is to compute the position by matching contextual informa-
tion reporting the beacons (i.e., access points) nearby the device against the known
location of existing networking infrastructure. Public wifi-based positioning is often
used in combination with other positioning methods, such as GPS and IP address
based geo-location so as to ensure a broad coverage of the territory across urban and
rural areas. Currently, these so-called hybrid positioning services are provided by
third-party location providers.
• LBSs are rapidly evolving in the direction of web applications in which services are
accessed through geo-enabled web browsers, i.e., browsers extended with the capa-
bility of localizing the hosting device. Market studies 1 forecast that 1.7 billion geo-
enabled browsers will be in use worldwide by 2016. Geo-location services can be
easily added to webpages through simple scripts which are then translated into posi-
tion queries forwarded to a third-party location provider. We refer to the LBSs relying
on this architecture as web-based LBSs. Note that in such a case, both the LBS provider
and the location providers can be not fully trusted that is what we wanted to empha-
size.
Figure 1 shows the three components of the web-based LBS architectures: besides the
client, the LBS provider and the location provider. The location provider computes the
position based on the contextual information (context) sent by the mobile device (client).
We call this architecture, WPS-centric2 as opposed to the conventional GPS-centric archi-
tectures.
1.1 Paper contribution
This paper presents an empirical study on privacy issues in emerging WPS-centric archi-
tectures. In this work we want to substantiate our thesis according to which the on-going
technological trend raises novel privacy concerns. Following a holistic approach, we exam-
ine the problem from three different and complementary perspectives:
1http://www.abiresearch.com/press/
3548-Widespread+Adoption+of+Geo-browsers+Will+Drive+Location+as+a+Key+Enabler+of+Mobile+Services
2We use this term for any architecture relying on a third party positioning service
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3Figure 1: Web-based LBS architecture
• Technical perspective. We analyze the features of novel LBS architectures, focusing in
particular on the characteristics of WPS and the emerging standard for geo-enabled
browsing
• User perspective. We present a hands-on experience of position data collection con-
ducted by tracking the visitors of geo-enabled web sites. The purpose is to gain in-
sight into the opportunities and privacy risks raised by geo-enabled browsers
• Legal perspective. We analyze the privacy policies of two major LBS and location
providers in the light of the European legislation
The paper is organized accordingly: Section 2 introduces the wifi-based positioning tech-
nology and third party positioning services. Section 3 introduces emerging standards
for geo-enabled browsing and presents two experiments of users’ position data collection
through web-based LBSs. Section 4 presents the legal perspective. Finally in the conclu-
sive Section we discuss a possible direction of research towards the protection of privacy
against third party location providers and report conclusive remarks.
2 Public wifi-based positioning systems
2.1 Preliminaries
Wireless LAN. The wireless LAN (WLAN or wifi) technology is a family of protocols
for data transmission based on the IEEE 802.11 specification [21]. The most popular among
those standards, i.e, 802.11b/g operate in the 2.4GHz band. This band is free licensed and is
used by a variety of low power devices, e.g., cordless phones. At this frequency, the signals
propagating through the air are affected by noise and lose strength while encountering
physical obstacles, such as walls and human bodies. The WLAN infrastructure consists of
a set of wireless access points (APs) connected to a cabled LAN.
Wifi-based positioning systems. Positioning technologies alternative to GPS have been
extensively investigated in the last decade [8, 20, 10, 12, 22]. Research on wifi-based posi-
tioning methods, i.e., methods relying on the WLANs infrastructure, develops along two
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4main lines, targeting localization in indoor spaces and localization in metropolitan envi-
ronments, respectively. The PlaceLab system [15, 11] falls into this second stream and is the
precursor of the WPS commercially available today. PlaceLab allows clients like notebooks
and PDAs to locate themselves by listening for radio beacons such as 802.11 APs, GSM cell
phone towers, and fixed Bluetooth devices that already exist in the environment. These
beacons all have unique IDs, for example, a MAC address. Clients compute their own lo-
cation by hearing one or more IDs, looking up the associated beacons positions in a local
database, and estimating their own position referenced to the beacons positions [15]. The
authors of PlaceLab deliberately chose not to rely on any external structure and processing
that could reveal user location [11]. In particular the beacons position database or part of
it is kept on the client. The authors state that the concern for privacy has been one of the
principles driving the system design [11].
Third party positioning services. The commercial deployment of the wifi positioning
technology, initiated with Skyhook Wireless3 is characterized by solutions generally relying
on centralized architectures. Typically the beacons’ position database is managed by a
third party location provider while the computation of the position can be either performed
by the location provider or by the client based on the content of the database. In both
cases, however, the location provider is aware of the client location. Figure 2 illustrates the
general architecture of a WPS, borrowed from Skyhook Wireless, that we adopt as reference
architecture:
Figure 2: Reference WPS architecture
The architecture consists of a set of clients, a set of APs and a Lookup Table (LLT). The
LLT is the beacon database containing the information relevant for the determination of
the position, e.g., the APs location. The LLT is handled by the location provider (LS). At
run-time:
• The client scans the WLANs and detects the APs in the vicinity along with the signal
strength. Each AP transmits frames carrying the MAC address (i.e., the AP identifier)
and additional information such as the name of the network (SSID). Hereinafter we
refer to this information as the client context.
• Thus the client transmits the context to the location provider. The context is thus
matched against the LLT, using some matching criteria. If the matching is successful,
then the information associated with the APs is used to determine the position of the
client.
3http://www.skyhookwireless.com/
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5{ "version": "1.1.0",
"host": "maps.google.com",
..........................
"wifi_towers": [ {
"mac_address": "01-23-45-67-89-ab",
"signal_strength": 8,
"age": 0},
{ "mac_address": "01-23-45-67-89-ac",
"signal_strength": 4,
"age": 0} ]}
Figure 3: Example of transmitted data
As an example of the communication protocol between the client and the location provider,
we report in Figure 3 a fragment of the data transmitted by the client requesting the posi-
tion to a location provider through Google Gears, an early plug-in providing geo-location
capabilities to web browsers 4. In this example, the information which is transferred to
Google Location Service (i.e., the location provider) includes the field ”wifi towers” spec-
ifying the list of observed APs, each identified by the six-bytes MAC Address, along with
the signal strength and an additional attribute.
2.1.1 Assumptions
For the sake of generality, and also because the information available on the internals of
the existing positioning services is very limited, we do not make any assumption on the
methods which compute the user’s position in WPS. Computation methods include for
example triangulation, centroid, fingerprint and statistic based techniques [15, 22]. Rather
we consider the positioning service as a black box that can be only analyzed through its
behavior. Abstractly, we model a positioning service through the function
geoloc(ls, σ, t)
which yields the position computed by location provider ls based on context σ at time t or
null if the position cannot be computed. We recall that the context σ is a set of APs together
with the signal strength of each AP, i.e., σ = {(api, ssi)}i∈[1,n] where n is the number of
APs in the context and ssi the signal strength of access point api. Whenever σ consists of a
unique AP, then the function returns a position coinciding or close to the physical location
of such AP. In practice we assume that APs can be localized. Now we present an empirical
characterization of the geo-location function.
2.2 Time-varying position
The contextual information in a fixed location changes in time. That is due to the variability
of the signal emitted by APs. People moving in an environment, doors opening and closing,
and other changes in the environment affect the signal [21, 20]. Moreover, APs can be
switched on and off, especially in domestic settings. As a consequence, at a fixed location,
4http://code.google.com/intl/it-IT/apis/gears/geolocation network protocol.html
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6Figure 4: Frequencies of the APs heard in a fixed position in a time interval
the signal strength received from an access point varies with time. And also the number of
access points covering a location varies with time [20].
We have performed an experiment to test the behavior of APs at a fixed location (i.e.,
the library of the University). To carry out the experiment we have developed a program
which scans the WLANs nearby the client, requests the position to a third party location
provider and records the association between the context and such position. The client is a
wifi-enabled PC Vaio, Series Z. During this experiment, we have sampled 50 contexts at a
rate of 1 sample every 50 seconds. Each context reports a set of APs. The union set of the
APs present in the samples consists of 18 elements. Of these, only a subset of APs (5 out of
18) are constantly heard. The histogram in Figure 4 reports the frequencies of each AP in
the time frame (the APs are labeled from A to R).
In general, if σ1 and σ2 are the contexts in a fixed location at time t1 and t2 6= t1 re-
spectively, it holds that σ1 6= σ2. Also the position computed by the location provider in a
fixed location is time-varying, thus in general: geoloc(ls, σ1, t1) 6= geoloc(ls, σ2, t2). Figure 5
shows the distribution of the positions ( a subset) returned by the location provider during
the experiment. In this case the accuracy of the position returned by the location provider
varies between 20 and 45 meters.
2.3 The quality of the LLT data
The content of the LLT affects the accuracy and reliability of the position information. For
example, if some APs among those reported in the context sent by the client, are not reg-
istered in the database, it may happen that the position cannot be returned at the best ac-
curacy, while if the coordinates of an AP are not correct then the returned position may be
unreliable. The properties of LLT completeness and soundness are important to evaluate
the quality of the positioning service. Yet, very limited information is commonly available
on the quality of the LLT.
The LLT typically contains millions of records. Various strategies are currently adopted
to populate the LLTs. For example Skyhook Wireless populates the database through a
process known as wardriving, namely a professional team of drivers drive around using
properly equipped cars and recording observed APs and cell towers along with the corre-
sponding GPS readings. A similar technique was initially adopted by Google through the
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7Figure 5: Position distribution in a fixed point
fleet of Streetview vehicles. Navizon applies a collaborative approach to mapping (crowd-
sourcing), in that the position of APs and cell towers are provided by registered end users
who are somehow rewarded for the collected data5. Another database which is fed by users
on a voluntary basis is the open database Wigle 6.
The wifi network infrastructure is also extremely dynamic. i.e., APs can be easily added,
removed or moved from one place to another. Following the experience of PlaceLab [15],
the LLT can be updated using the contextual information sent by the clients querying their
position. It has been shown however that this kind of solution paves the way to security
attacks. For example, attackers can insert wrong data and/or modify existing entries [18].
Several factors thus affect the quality of data. We are not aware, however, of any indicator
of the size and quality of the database apart from few statistics reported by Wigle7.
2.3.1 Experiment
The map in Figure 6 illustrates the result of an experiment that we conducted in 2010 in
a small region close to the Milan metropolitan area, using non professional wardrivers
to analyze the quality of a LLT on that area. The map reports the position of both the
APs registered in the LLT (yellow pinpoints) and those that have been observed during
in-house wardriving (orange pinpoints). All the pinpoints are reported on a Google Earth
map and each of them is labeled with the MAC Address of the corresponding AP and the
SSID of the related network. We have observed that in most cases, whenever an AP is
reported in the LLT, the distance from the actual position is within the tolerance threshold
(i.e., within 150 meters). If so, the coordinates in the database can be considered correct. In
certain cases, however, the actual position and the corresponding registered position are far
from each other. An example of inconsistent positions is reported in Figure 6: the elements
underlined in green refer to the same AP but there is significant distance between them.
Such a discrepancy means that the coordinates reported in the database are very likely not
reliable.
5http://www.navizon.com/
6http://www.wigle.net
7Currently, Wigle contains more then 32 millions w-ifi networks and more than 1 billion geo-referenced APs
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8Figure 6: The APs observed on field (orange) vs. the APs reported in the database (yellow)
In synthesis, the position returned by the location provider can be incorrect, moreover
the position computed by two different location providers, say ls1 and ls2 are likely differ-
ent,i.e., geoloc(ls1, σ, t) 6= geoloc(ls2, σ, t).
3 Web browsers with geo-location capabilities
All major web browsers have recently added the capability of geo-locating the hosting
device. The diffusion of geo-enabled browsers has been pushed by emerging standards, in
primis, the W3C Geolocation API specification [19].
W3C Geolocation API specification. This specification defines a standard set of func-
tions which can be embedded in webpages scripts to request the position of the device
hosting the browser. As an example, the key function is the getCurrentPosition() method:
the specification prescribes that when called, the function must immediately return and
then asynchronously attempt to obtain the current location of the device. If the attempt
is successful, a success callback procedure is called. If the attempt fails, an error callback
procedure must be invoked [19].
Note that the interface is agnostic of the underlying location information sources as well
as of the geo-locating process, i.e., the way the position is obtained and by whom is com-
pletely transparent to the web page developer only depending on how those functions
are interpreted by the browsers. Actually in the current implementations, the geo-location
function calls are translated into queries forwarded to a third party location provider whose
reference is embedded either in the browser or in the operating system.
The W3C Geolocation specification does not ignore the privacy issue. A fundamental
normative requirement in the specification prescribes that the user agent must, in most
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initiating a process to obtain a cached or new location [6]. Upon the request of consensus,
the user can respond yes or no.
Whether this form of protection is sufficient to ensure an effective safeguard of privacy is
an open issue which has not been much discussed beyond [6, 4]. In this section we want
to contribute to this discussion, reporting the results of a hands-on experience of users’
position data collection.
3.1 Privacy awareness: experimenting with users
The geo-location capabilities of the browsers compliant with the W3C standard can be used
for different purposes. In particular, we distinguish two scenarios. In the former scenario,
the user accesses a website to explicitly request a LBS. For example the users accessing the
Foursquare website through a geo-enabled browser 8 deliberately share their position with
the members of the geo-social network. In the second scenario, the browser solicits the
user’s position although the user has not requested any LBS. Since this is the case which
probably raises more concerns for privacy we have performed an experiment with users.
The idea is to track the users visiting certain seemingly innocuous websites. In spite of the
its simplicity, this experiment allows to test a number of aspects:
• The current popularity of geo-enabled browsers
• The user’s consensus (yes/no) when the position is requested by the browser
• The personal information that can be extracted from the collected location data
• The accuracy with which users are tracked
3.1.1 Experimental setting
Attribute
a. UUID Unique identifier associated with the client
b. IP The ip address of the visitor
c. Position The position of the visitor returned by the positioning service
d. Accuracy The accuracy of the position
e. User Agent The browser
f. Time The time at which the web site is accessed
g. Consensus The user’s response or unsupported
Table 1: Structure of the collected data
For this experiment, we have selected two existing websites, the one located in Milan and
the other in Istanbul, in order to diversify the experiments and compare the results across
two different countries. The websites are accessed mostly from PCs and only for a limited
percentage through smartphones or similar. In both cases, the visitors of the websites are
primarily students.
The interaction scenario is as follows: a visitor accessing through a geo-enabled web
browser is prompted with the question on whether he/she permits a web site, identified
8Using the geo-enabled version of Firefox
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by an url, to monitor his/her position. The user can accept, deny, or can even decide not
to answer. In any case, this choice does not have any practical and visible consequence
for the user. No other information or explanation is provided to the users, beyond what is
implicitly provided by the implementation of the standard geo-location interface. There-
fore the url of the website monitoring the position is the only information that is shown.
Transparently to the user, we gather and record for each visit the information reported in
Table 1. Details are provided here below:
a. The UUID (universal unique identifier) is generated the first time a user visits the
page and then stored as cookie on the user’s mobile device. Actually this mechanism
does not guarantee the uniqueness of visitors because users can decide to delete cook-
ies, or it may happen that users do not allow the local storage of cookies. Another
situation which my occur is that the same users access the website using different
computers, for example from the university lab and at home.
c. The position is a pair of geographical coordinates. If the position cannot be deter-
mined by the location provider, either because users do not give their consent to the
disclosure of position or the web browser is not geo-enabled, a coarse position is com-
puted based on the IP address. In this case the position is the representative point of
a town or of smaller areas, e.g., university campus.
d. The Accuracy field is meaningful if the browser is geo-enabled. In that case the accu-
racy of the position is returned by the location provider.
e. The User Agent is a string which describes various features of the web browser. The
users agents which are not relevant for the analysis and which may access the web
site, i.e., web crawlers, are removed from the database. The user agent is also useful
to get a rough estimation of the number of different clients accessing the website as
such string is a peculiar, although not exclusive, characteristic of a client.
g. We distinguish three kinds of responses: a) the browser does not support the geo-
location standard. In this case the value of the field is unsupported. b) the user gives
his/her consent: the value of the field is yes. c) The user denies the consensus: the
value of the field is no.
3.1.2 Experiment 1
The first experiment has been carried out in Milan in the period October-December 2010.
The website which has been geo-enabled is the homepage of one of the authors of this pa-
per. In order to attract a sufficient number of visitors other than researchers the experiment
has been carried out in the period in which the author taught an undergraduate course at
the Department of Geography of the University of Milan, in the period October-December
2010. Students have a humanistic background, most of them live in the same region (e.g.,
Lombardy), either in Milan of in the towns in proximity of Milan. The sample data is re-
stricted to the visits carried out from positions in the region around Milan.
Data analysis is performed over a cleansed database: the entries reporting an IP address
in the domain of the University are removed to avoid multiple UUIDs for the same user as
well as the entries related to user agents other than browsers. Table 2 summarizes the main
features of the sample along with the geographical coordinates of the region of interest.
This sample consists of 227 UUCDs while the number of visits (hits) is 940.
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Sample #
region ( 8.4167, 45.9300), (10.4333, 44.9830)
#uucd 227
#ip 623
#UserAgentString 162
#hits 940
Table 2: Milan sample
Figure 7: Experiment 1. The locations of the visitors. Color conventions: grey pinpoints
means that the browser does not support geo-location; orange: the user denies the consen-
sus to the geo-location; blue and sky blue: the user gives his/her consent
Qualitative considerations.
• The map in Figure 7 displays a subset of the collected data plotted onto Google maps.
Each pinpoint corresponds to a visit and shows the position of the user at the time the
web site has been accessed. Note that the same position can be occupied at different
times. The color of the pinpoint highlights the consensus given by the most recent
visitor of the web site located at that point: the gray color is used for unsupported
consensus; orange for no consensus; dark blue and sky blue for yes consensus. In
the latter case, sky blue is used for those positions which have an accuracy higher
than 1000 meters. This situations occur for example when the location provider is
not able to determine a position unless using an IP address. It can be noticed that
the locations are scattered in the region. That is due to the fact that a significant
percentage of visitors live in towns close to Milan, and it is likely that the website is
accessed from home. It is also evident that the the majority of people uses a browser
which does not have geo-location capabilities; there is also a significant percentage of
people that deny their consensus to the position disclosure.
• In spite of the limited information stored in the database, it is relatively easy to ex-
tract personal information, such as the user’s home address. As an example consider
the position reported in the Google map in Figure 8. Besides the pinpoint, the Figure
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Figure 8: Detail of the collected data
also shows the IP address, the position, the accuracy, the browser and the consen-
sus. For privacy reasons, we have removed the road names from the map and in part
the geographical coordinates and the IP address. It can be noticed that the user has
a Macintosh PC and accesses the web site at around 0:42. It is thus very likely that
the user lives in the buildings in proximity of the blue marker because the position is
relatively accurate (80 meters) and at that time, around midnight, the user is likely at
home. This hypothesis is also supported by the fact that there is another position in
proximity which is associated with the same UUID and has been detected in a differ-
ent date. Moreover the positioning technique is very likely WPS. This follows from
considerations on the accuracy, the type of computer and browser, the nationality. All
that seems sufficient to identify the user as an individual living at that address.
Quantitative considerations. Table 3 reports the percentages for the different types of
consensus (i.e., unsupported, yes, no) computed over the number of hits (% on hits ) and
the set of UUIDs (% on UUID). Moreover we report the relative percentage of yes/no over
the number of UUCDs (% on supported ). In very few cases, the same user (i.e., UUID)
exhibits a different type of consensus. Table 4 reports for each browser the number of
Consensus % on hits % on UUIDs % on supported
Unsupported 59 63 -
Y es 4 7 19
No 37 30 81
Table 3: Users consensus
UUIDs for each type of consensus. Note that we do not report the different versions of
the browsers. Normally the oldest version of a browser do not support geo-location. The
exception is Microsoft Explorer (MSIE) which can be geo-enabled by certain plug-ins (e.g.,
GTB 6.6).
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Browser #total UUID #unsupported #yes #no
IPhone Safari 1 1
MSIE (6.0-8.0) 128 128
MSIE(6.0-8.0 with enabled geolocation) 50 50
FireFox 15 7 5 3
Opera 1 1
Chrome 2 2
Macintosh Safari 18 2 8 8
Table 4: Types of browsers
3.2 Experiment 2
The second experiment has been carried out in Istanbul in February 2011. The web site
which has been geo-enabled ((http : //www.confessu.org) is extensively used by the stu-
dents of the Sabanci University to share their feelings, thoughts and confesses anony-
mously. The site does not require a registration so everyone can write something or read
each others messages easily. In this experiment we have tried to examine to what extent
the relation of trust between the user and the website depends on the name, i.e., url, of the
website requesting the position. We remind that no additional information is given to users
a part such url.
Who is requesting my position? When the user visits the web site, the browser pops
up a message like: <url> wants to know your location. Normally the url which is notified
coincides with the url of the website, meaning that the user’s position is requested by the
website owner. During this experiment, we use an expedient to replace the actual url with
names of domains having different appeal. The expedient is to add a html <iframe> tag
to the home page of the website. The iframe (inline frame) is as a frame inside a webpage
which may contain another page from another website. The iframe tag is supported by all
major browsers, moreover it is often used for malicious intents. We use two different urls.
In the first case, we show the domain name ”cryptovirology.org” which is likely considered
as malicious. The notification is: ge01p.cryptovirology.org wants to know your location. In the
second case, we choose a more friendly domain name, ”googleservices.gmaps.me”.
The experiment lasted 12 days. In spite of the short time, there is some evidence that the
level of trust changes depending on the website requesting the position. The percentage
of people who agree to share their position is low. Consider however that users interact
anonymously with this system and thus reasonably they do not wan to reveal personal
information. The great majority of users do not use geo-enabled browsers.
Sample phase 1 phase 2
#UUID 595 723
#ip 419 479
#UserAgentString 124 146
#hits 1022 1564
Table 5: Istanbul sample
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Quantitative evaluation. The sample is characterized in Table 5. The experiment consists
of two phases, phase 1 and phase 2. In the former phase the url which appears in the noti-
fication is ” cryptovirology.org” while in the second phase is ”googleservices.gmaps.me”.
Each phase has a duration of 6 days. In the first phase there are 595 UUCDs and in the sec-
ond phase 723 (such discrepany is not relevant for the analysis). Table 6 reports the type of
Consensus % UUIDs phase 1 % on supp. % UUIDs phase 2 % on supp.
Unsupp. 55.44 58
Y es 0.33 0.7 2 4.7
No 44.22 99.3 39.98 95.3
Table 6: Users consensus
consensus in the two phases. We report the relative percentage of yes and no in each phase
(column: % on support ). Notice the percentage of positive consensus in the two phases. In
absolute terms the percentages are low, yet in relative terms, the difference is interesting.
Browser #total UUIDs #unsupported #yes #no
IPhone Safari 13 0 7 6
MSIE(6.0-9.0) 595 593 0 2
MSIE(6.0-8.0 with enabled geolocation) 91 34 0 57
FireFox 181 96 3 82
Opera 5 4 0 1
Chrome 348 3 3 342
Macintosh Safari 80 17 2 61
Blackberry Safari 1 0 1 0
Nokia E72 Browser NG 4 4 0 0
Table 7: Types of browsers
Finally Table 7 reports, as in the previous experiment, the distribution of user agents for
the whole period of the experiment, segmented by type of consensus. In can be noticed the
richer variety of user agents, that can be in partly explained with the different background
of students.
3.3 In summary
• The results of the experiment across the two countries are somehow homogeneous
• The vast majority of users use browsers which are not geo-enabled. In both cases the
most popular web browser is MSIE. At the time of the paper writing, however, the
geo-enabled version MSIE 9.0 has been released. Therefore the number of users of
geo-enabled browsers is expected to rapidly increase
• It is relatively easy for websites to track people and identify where people live. These
sites can be created in a very simple manner. It is also relatively easy to catch more
user consensus by properly tuning the notification message
• The percentage of users prompt to share their position is relatively low. Note how-
ever that people is not given any information motivating the collection of position
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information or any form of compensation for it, thus the percentage refers to people
ready to give away their position for nothing
4 Privacy policies of LBS and location providers
After the technical and the user perspective, we turn to consider the legal dimension. In
particular, we analyze two sample privacy policies from US-based companies, a geo-social
network provider and a location provider respectively, in the light of the European legisla-
tion. Preliminarily we emphasize some critical aspects of the European law related to the
treatment of location information. We refer the reader to [16] for an overview of privacy
laws across different countries.
4.1 The location information in the European Directive
The European law through the Directive 95/46/EC (simply Directive hereinafter) distin-
guishes between ordinary personal data and sensitive data. Personal data is “any informa-
tion relating to an identified or identifiable natural person...”. Sensitive data are personal
data which can reveal “racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life”.
The treatment of sensitive data is usually subject to more severe restrictions by law than
ordinary personal data 9. i.e., the Legislator requests a different treatment based on the
very nature of personal data. Indeed, such a strict categorization falls short when personal
data have a mutable and complex nature and fall in part under the definition of ordinary
personal data and in part under the definition of sensitive data.
Directive 2002/58/EC defines location data as ”any data processed in an electronic com-
munications network, indicating the geographic position of the terminal equipment of a
user or a Publicly available electronic communications service”. The location information
collected by location and LBS providers is an example of information presenting a mutable
and dual nature.
When users are tracked, sensitive information can be disclosed regardless of the user’s
consent granted at the moment of the service request. For example, data can reveal that the
user has to undergo a special daily treatment at a hospital, or that the user has requested
a service designed for people with specific sexual preferences10 Moreover, the nature of
location information can change, for example it can initially represent ordinary personal
data and later on become sensitive upon the occurrence of certain events.
It is therefore clear that the diffusion of LBSs calls for an integrated legal, technical and
governance approach. This would create some (legal) safeguards for users and would re-
shape the technology so that users can actually exercise control over their own location
data.
4.1.1 The on-going revision of the Directive
The need of a regulation for location data has been emphasized in a recent meeting of the
European Privacy Platform group of the European Parliament 11 focusing on the ongoing
9Directive 95/46/EC
10See, for example, Grindr, a social network for gay and bisexual (http://grindr.com/Grindr iPhone App/Grindr -
Meet Guys Near You on your iPhone.html)
11March 16, 2011, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/11/183
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revision of the Directive. Such revision will be based on four pillars, reported below. Such
principles will likely significantly affect location data collection practices:
• The right to be forgotten: the goal to ensure that individuals have really the right to
withdraw consent to data processing.
• Transparency: the goal is to ensure ”greater clarity” when users subscribe social net-
works. Moreover children must be made aware of the risks of social networks.
• Privacy by default, i.e., data protection requirements also must apply if data are pro-
cessed for a purpose different from that for which they were originally collected.
• Protection regardless of data location: EU law should apply irrespective of the lo-
cation of data processing and the means used by the controller to process the data.
According to the Commissioner, any on-line service targeting EU consumers must
comply with EU data protection law.
4.2 Analysis of sample privacy policies
A privacy policy discloses how a party gathers, uses, discloses and manages customer’s
data. We consider the privacy policies of two major service providers and discuss to what
extent those policies comply with the guidelines of the Directive:
• Foursquare is the provider of a location-based social networking application12. Users
can share their location with friends while collecting points and virtual badges. The
overall goal is to allow users to bookmark information about venues they visit and
get suggestions about nearby venues. The social network can be accessed through a
mobile application or through a geo-enabled browser (equipped with specific plug-
ins, i.e. FourSquareFox for Firefox).
• Google Location Service provides positioning services to several geo-enabled browsers
(i.e., Chrome, Firefox). Our analysis focuses on the privacy practices specific to the
Google Location Service (simply Google, hereinafter) that provides geo-location in-
formation to the Mozilla Firefox Geolocation Feature13.
In this analysis, we consider the following aspects: the collected data; the granularity of
the processed data; the user’s consent; and data retention. Below we report and comment
excerpts of the privacy policies related to these aspects.
4.2.1 Collected data
Foursquare: ”automatically receives and records information on our server logs from your
browser or mobile platform, including your location, IP address, cookie information, and
the page you requested”.
Google: ”will collect, depending on the capabilities of your device, information about the
wifi routers closest to you, cell ids of the cell towers closest to you, and the strength of your
wifi or cell signal ” and ”For each request sent to our service, we also collect IP address,
user agent information, and unique identifier of your client”.
12http://foursquare.com/legal/privacy
13http://www.google.com/privacy/lsf.html
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In both cases collected data comprise: 1) IP address, 2) cookie information or unique client
identifier, 3) location. Moreover, Foursquare collects additional information about the user
such as ”name, email address, phone number, birthday, Twitter and/or Facebook user-
names,..., and browser information”. Google specifies the data first to process Firefox geo-
location request, then ”to develop new features or products and services, or to improve the
overall quality of any of Googles other products and services.”
Both services imply personal data processing. Note that Foursquare declares that ”We
treat this data as non-Personal Information, except where we are required to do otherwise
under applicable law”. We claim that, according to Directive 95/46/EC and 2002/58/EC,
those data imply personal data processing and are subject to national privacy laws for all
member States.
4.2.2 Granularity of processed data
Both policies state that data are only processed in aggregated form. In particular: ”Foursquare
only uses this [automatically collected] data in aggregate form. We may provide aggregate
information to our partners about how our customers, collectively, use our site, so that our
partners may also understand how often people use their services and our Service”.
Google: ”Information collected above will be anonymized and aggregated before being used
by Google to develop new features or products and services, or to improve the overall qual-
ity of any of Googles other products and services. This means that your IP address and
unique identifier of your client will be stripped out before being used by any of Googles
other products or features.”
We observe that in both cases the processing methods are not clearly specified. Moreover,
it is well known from the research literature, that the simple removal of users’ identifiers is
not enough to protect identities and in general personal information [17].
4.2.3 User’s consent and data retention
Foursquare requires the user’s consent and the acceptance of the privacy policies. Morover
it allows the user to specify privacy settings. The default setting implies the sharing of
informations, but several disclaimer are included in the privacy policy to make the user
aware of the available privacy options.
Google uses an opt-in scheme, i.e., websites can access the location data only if the Fire-
fox Geolocation Feature is enabled. Google limits its responsibility specifying that ”If the
website is a non-Google website, we do not have control over the website or its privacy
practices. Please carefully consider any websites privacy practices before consenting to
share your location with that website.” and ”All requests must be sent through your inter-
net service provider or mobile carrier network and your service provider or carrier may
have access to the request. For information regarding your service providers or carriers
treatment of your information, please consult their privacy policies.”
Privacy settings are friendly in Foursquare. Following the W3C specification, the pri-
vacy options available through Firefox are only to enable/disable geo-location. Moreover,
Foursquare has also a policy about data retention, specifying that data are retained for 90
days after the user is removed while Google does not specify any policy.
TRANSACTIONS ON DATA PRIVACY ()
18
4.2.4 In summary
The two privacy policies are to a large extent compliant with the EU privacy principles.
Some aspects, however, seem not to be sufficiently clear as requested by the Directive and
the national laws, in particular the data processing methods. Another aspect that is not
clear regards the identification of the entities or categories of entity to whom or which
the personal data may be communicated and who or which may get to know said data
in their capacity as designated representative(s) in the States territory, data processor(s) or
person(s) in charge of the processing is not specified, and this is an important issue for all
the data subjects that want to exercise their rights.
5 Concluding remarks
Third party positioning services bring to the attention of researchers novel challenges for
the protection of privacy because the position can be disclosed to untrusted location providers.
We present a possible direction of research towards a solution protecting against this kind
of privacy breach.
5.1 Protecting location against untrusted third parties
The research question is: can the user access a web-based LBS without communicating the
position to an untrusted location provider? Consider a user willing to share his position
with the website of a trusted ecologist organization, without letting the location provider
know that he is at home. In this case the LBS provider is trusted while the location provider
is untrusted. Note that this scenario is specular to the one assumed by Gruteser et al. [9].
We now discuss how to deal with such an issue. As a first step, we define more precisely
the privacy attack.
Threat model Let LS = {ls1, ...lsn} a set of location providers. Assume that the members
of LS can be either trusted or untrusted, while the LBS provider is trusted.
We say that there is location service attack if everytime the user accesses the web-based LBS,
the position is computed by an untrusted location provider i.e.:
∀lsi, σ, t, geoloc(lsi, σ, t) 6= null→ lsiis untrusted
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 9: Protection strategies against the location service attack
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Protection strategies. We envisage three different approaches that are illustrated in Fig-
ure 9. Assume a simple scenario in which a client can query any location provider in the
set LS = {lp1, lp2, lp3}.
• The straightforward solution is to let the user choose a trusted third party from the
set LS. Figure 9(a) exemplifies the case in which the client only establishes a commu-
nication with lp2. Obviously, this approach has little sense if the location providers
are all untrusted.
• A completely different approach is to transfer the geolocation capabilities to the client
like in PlaceLab [15] (Figure 9 (b)). In practice, the client maintains locally the infor-
mation which is relevant for the computation of the position, i.e., a local LLT. We see
two critical aspects in this approach: it is likely that this solution has a cost for the
user, especially if the quality of the position information is expected to be comparable
to the one provided by third party location providers. Therefore it is questionable
whether this solution can reach the mass market and thus be socially relevant. The
second aspect regards privacy usability, especially in relation to the need of keeping
the local LLT up-to-date.
• We propose a third direction (Figure 9 (c)). The idea is not to prevent but rather to
minimize the interaction with the location provider by caching a subset of the posi-
tions which have been already visited. In this way the client needs to interact with
the location provider only when the requested position is not present in the cache.
The deployment of this strategy raises a number of issues, for example how to select
the positions to store in the cache and also how to define a suitable matching criteria
taking into account that the context of a position is uncertain. A related problem is
how to keep the cache aligned with the evolving WLANs infrastructure.
5.2 Conclusion
In summary, in this paper we argue that web-based LBSs offer incredible opportunities to
location and LBS providers to collect huge amount of position data in a simple way. The
impact of such evolution over location privacy is not clear. Also it is not clear whether
the privacy mechanism currently specified by W3C is appropriate to ensure a sufficient
protection. For this, the experiments with users can be of vital importance to gain insights
into user’s expectation on privacy.
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